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Economic reforms and rural markets
Market transactions in rural areas of sub-Saharan 
Africa (SSA) are usually small, because the markets 
are thin and point-to-point transportation of 
commodities is difficult. The prices offered are not 
competitive and volumes traded are usually season 
dependent. Where market infrastructure is weak 
and under-developed, liberalization and structural 
adjustment policies have not been able to improve 
market access; and the private sector has failed 
to make the investments needed for proper and 
effective market coordination. 
Nevertheless, the new economic environment has 
opened a window of opportunity for farmers to 
harness market opportunities, diversify into tradable 
products and reduce dependence on subsistence 
farming. The removal of market barriers increased 
competition and allowed farmers to choose the 
buyers of their outputs and the suppliers of key 
inputs. Despite these positive developments, markets 
have not been able to spur commercialization of 
smallholder agriculture that could provide incentives 
for increased production and investments for 
managing production risks. Hence, smallholder 
market participation and marketed surplus remain 
very limited. High transaction costs and the inability 
of smallholder farmers to consistently supply quality 
products remain key impediments to the realization 
of the benefits of liberalization, while geographical 
dispersion has limited market development. These 
factors have deprived farmers of the incentives to 
produce high value differentiated products with 
desirable traits.
Based on a review of experiences across SSA and 
a case study in semi-arid Kenya, this policy brief 
highlights the role of market institutions and 
producer marketing groups (PMGs) in enhancing 
the market opportunities for the poor through better 
coordination of production and marketing functions, 
and facilitating contracts with market agents along 
the value chain. They can provide essential market 
power to small-scale producers.
The case for rural institutions 
Market failure is a situation where markets fail 
to efficiently organize production and marketing 
functions to maximize social objectives. The 
common causes include high transaction costs, 
lack of information and imperfect property rights. 
Its effects tend to be magnified in areas where 
investments in basic infrastructure and market-
supporting institutions are lacking, especially in 
drought-prone regions where climatic variability 
heightens the associated economic risks. Grain 
prices fluctuate significantly according to local 
supply and demand that is amplified by seasonal 
weather conditions. If the seasonal price trends are 
predictable, smallholders can potentially benefit 
from higher prices by bulking their produce and 
marketing them when prices are high. The associated 
benefits will depend on the costs of coordinating 
supply, storage and marketing as well as the 
opportunity cost of capital held during the season.
For markets to effectively serve smallholder farmers 
and the rural poor, it is necessary to strengthen 
supporting institutions that promote competition 
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and establish mechanisms for contract formation 
and enforcement. Farmer collective action can be an 
important strategy to strengthen market-supporting 
institutions in rural areas. Farmer organizations and 
cooperatives that facilitate business opportunities 
and market functions are evolving in many African 
countries (eg, Cameroon, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, 
Malawi, Mali and Zambia).
Under enabling conditions, the PMGs and similar 
farmer organizations can facilitate market access to 
the poor through horizontal and vertical coordination 
of production and marketing activities. They can 
help shorten the long and complex marketing 
channels that prevail in many rural input and output 
markets by directly linking smallholders with 
the upper end of the value chain. This can help 
reduce transaction costs and increase the share of 
the consumer price reaching small producers. The 
experiences in semi-arid Kenya highlight several 
interlinked constraints that call for new approaches 
and policy interventions to facilitate and support 
development of rural institutions. 
Producer marketing groups in Kenya 
While farmer cooperative societies are common 
across SSA, there is lack of empirical experience 
about PMGs that deal with food crops and operate 
in drought-prone areas. In order to evaluate their 
potentials in improving market access for the rural 
poor, ICRISAT and partners facilitated the formation 
of ten PMGs between 2002 and 2003 in two semi-
arid districts (Mbeere and Makueni) based on 
voluntary membership and clear commitments from 
members. No financial incentives were provided 
other than access to improved technologies and 
institutional support for group activities. The PMGs 
were formally registered as welfare societies as is 
permitted under Kenyan law. They had well-defined 
objectives, by-laws, and an elected body that leads 
the group on behalf of the members. Their objectives 
go beyond social welfare and include better access to 
markets, technologies and inputs at affordable prices; 
better prices for local produce; and development of 
business skills for commercialization of production.
An ICRISAT study of smallholder marketing in these 
districts conducted in 2005 found that 45% of the 
grain traded volume and 36% of the transactions 
occur at the farm-gate. About 90% of the grain sold 
by farmers is transacted at the farm-gate 
or village markets (less than 5 km off farm-gate). 
The study indicates that grain prices are unlikely to 
improve significantly within the range of 5 km from 
the farm-gate. Farmer prices tend to increase slightly 
as distance increases beyond 5 km, but the marginal 
increment (estimated at Ksh 3/km per 90 kg bag) is 
unlikely to create incentives for farmers to transport 
grain over large distances. The study also found that 
rural wholesalers and brokers/assemblers jointly 
control over 80% of the grain sold by farmers. About 
75% of the grain was sold immediately after harvest 
when local supply is high and prices are low. The rural 
buyers do not pay any premium for superior quality, 
which undermines the incentive for farmers to supply 
diverse and quality products. Quality however tends 
to become important when the traders sell the grain 
to larger urban traders and processors.
The challenge, therefore, is to enhance the 
participation of PMGs to increase the market power 
of small producers and provide alternative marketing 
channels that offer better prices. The experiences 
in semi-arid Kenya show that this is indeed feasible. 
The PMGs have offered attractive marketing 
outlets for small producers – on average, they pay 
about Ksh 6/kg above the price paid by brokers and 
middlemen. The prices paid by the PMGs to the 
member farmers after covering their costs are about 
22 to 24% higher than the prices paid by brokers and 
middlemen (Table 1). 
Table 1. The effect of PMGs on pigeonpea prices in 
eastern Kenya.
Buyer Season
Point of 
sale Price (Ksh/kg)
PMG price 
advantage (%)
PMG
Immediately 
after harvest Farmgate 29.81 24.00
Broker ,, ,, 24.04
PMG
Immediately 
after harvest 5 km 29.93 23.88
Broker ,, 5 km 24.16
PMG
4–5 months 
after harvest Farmgate 31.16 22.72
Broker ,, ,, 25.39
PMG
4–5 months 
after harvest 5 km 31.29 22.62
Broker ,, 5 km 25.52
The PMGs were able to bulk the grain and sell it to 
buyers beyond the village at better prices. However, 
this promising opportunity is hindered by several 
impediments to collective marketing that limit their 
competitiveness and market share. Their potential 
is unlikely to be realized until these constraints are 
addressed.
Constraints to PMG functions
The PMGs are evolving institutional arrangements 
for enhancing market opportunities for smallholder 
farmers. Like any other new institutional innovation, 
they face several challenges in their operations. 
Legal framework:  Like in many SSA countries, the 
existing legal framework in Kenya is inadequate for 
the development of PMGs and their transition to 
cooperative societies. Their status as ‘welfare groups’ 
prevents the PMGs from accessing essential business 
services. There is a lack of mandated agencies and 
supporting institutions for the advancement of 
PMGs. The nascent PMGs are weak and cannot 
successfully operate within the provisions of the 
existing legal and regulatory framework of the 
cooperatives. 
Capital and credit: The PMGs are operating on 
small funds raised from the membership. They face 
capital constraints to access essential services and 
engage into marketing functions. They also lack 
the necessary capital to pay farmers at the time of 
delivery. The PMGs take about 35 days to sell the 
grain and pay the farmer while other buyers often 
pay immediately or take a maximum of 2 days 
(Figure 1). This makes the PMGs less attractive 
to cash-constrained farmers. The challenge is to 
establish alternative strategies that would enable 
access to affordable financial services.
Low trade volumes increase transaction costs, 
making it difficult for the PMGs to take advantage 
of economies of scale. Future strategies should 
emphasize interventions that improve productivity, 
mitigate the effects of droughts and allow better 
coordination of small supplies through large-scale 
bulking and joint marketing.
Price variability: This refers to the volatility 
of commodity prices in a given year. Prices are 
influenced by cropping and harvesting regimes, 
rainfall distribution, and recurrent droughts. Owing 
to unpredictable prices, the farmers and the PMGs 
are facing difficulties in storing grain and in planning 
production activities. Future opportunities to 
enhance the PMG functions need to emphasize 
options that mitigate the price risk. 
Market intelligence: Market intelligence is 
the process of acquiring and analyzing relevant 
information in order to understand the market, to 
determine current and future needs and preferences, 
and to assess changes in the business environment 
that may affect future opportunities. Lack of 
adequate information on alternative marketing 
channels and value chains prevents the PMGs from 
taking advantage of available markets. The challenge 
is to identify mechanisms through which access to 
market information can be improved.
Governance: Efficient coordination (vertical and 
horizontal) of production and marketing functions 
relies on good PMG governance and organization. 
Ensuring consistent supply of quality products 
requires ability to monitor and enforce standards, 
and create transparent incentive systems. The policy 
and legal environment should support enforcement 
of such internal rules that enhance governance and 
efficiency. Internal group laws need to be flexible, 
and they should facilitate good participatory 
governance and also allow for effective interaction 
with the private sector. 
Policy options and strategies  
While multiple strategies could be pursued to 
strengthen rural institutions and facilitate the 
development of PMGs, the following focal 
interventions may address the bottlenecks in 
collective marketing: 
In the short-term, governments should institute legal 
and policy frameworks that recognize PMGs 
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Figure 1. Time taken to pay farmers after selling (days).
Drought: The volume of grain that is handled by the 
PMGs is low even in good years and gets severely 
diminished in bad years. Recurrent droughts in semi-
arid areas regularly push smallholders into poverty 
and undermine the ability to produce for markets. 
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as legal entities and facilitate their transition into 
commercially viable enterprises. This would call for 
legal and policy mechanisms at a pre-cooperative 
stage. In many cases, this is a pre-requisite that 
determines the success of subsequent policies. In 
addition, Grameen type group lending schemes 
could be devised for enhancing access to credit 
services to legally recognized PMGs. Credit linked 
to grain reserves (inventory credit) could allow the 
PMGs to pay farmers a proportion of the value of 
grain at the time of delivery. The field evidence from 
semi-arid Kenya has shown that farmers are often 
willing and able to defer sales by several weeks if 
they can be paid a third of the grain value upfront. 
This would strengthen incentives for collective 
action while also allowing farmers get better prices 
for their produce.
In the medium-term, because of the absence of 
financial institutions, governments and other agencies 
should launch credit guarantee schemes that could 
encourage private sector lenders to enter rural 
markets. Such schemes may be complemented by 
micro-saving and financing options that facilitate 
farmer investment in profitable technologies.
In the medium to long-term, strategies that improve 
productivity and reduce vulnerability to drought are 
needed to foster sustainable growth in marketable 
surplus from less favourable areas. Integrated   
solutions that combine improved crop and livestock 
technologies, soil and water management; and 
strengthening of institutions at the farm, community 
and landscape level have proven to be useful in 
drought-prone areas of South Asia (eg, India). 
Governments also have important roles in enhancing 
the capacity of farmer groups to promote market 
functions in rural areas. This would include provision 
of public goods to improve market performance 
and facilitating investments in communication to 
support information flow and adoption of improved 
agricultural technologies. In addition, strengthening 
rural institutions and farmer marketing groups would 
require public sector resources and action plans to 
address the specific needs and constraints faced by 
the PMGs and similar organizations. Such support 
is justified given the livelihood benefits to the rural 
poor and the growth linkages derived from improved 
commercialization of agriculture.
Conclusions
?? Market liberalization has opened opportunities 
for smallholder farmers to diversify production 
and better target existing and emerging markets. 
But pervasive rural market imperfections impede 
farmer responses to economic reforms and limit 
their ability to exploit market opportunities. 
?? The PMGs can provide effective institutional 
arrangements to improve markets for the poor. 
Collective action is the key to reduce transaction 
costs and for small-scale producers to access 
essential agricultural services. Many such groups 
however face multiple challenges such as lack of 
credit, low volumes, price volatility and inadequate 
legal frameworks. 
?? In addition to provision of essential infrastructure 
and public goods, governments also have roles in 
supporting the emergence and development of 
rural institutions. This would include good legal 
and policy frameworks that facilitate and support 
farmer-marketing groups to develop into effective 
agri-business enterprises. 
?? The social benefits and positive role that farmer 
marketing groups can play in bridging market 
failures and improving rural livelihoods may also 
justify targeted subsidies and incentive systems that 
stimulate and support their development. 
